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These problems are not raised by the principal case, but before proposed legislation
is enacted, they should merit close scrutiny. The gratifying feature of the principal
case is that it is another blow to the theory of Collector v. Day. In the future, the Court
will probably not approach the problem by considering whether a state agency is being
taxed but whether such a tax would hamper the state in performing its duties.
Corporations-Parent and Subsidiary-Set-off of Subsidiary's Claims against
Parent's Indebtedness-[Indiana].-The defendant manufacturing corporation main-
tained a subsidiary under a separate name, the latter's sole asset being a deposit in the
plaintiff bank. In financial reports of the defendant to the plaintiff the subsidiary
was referred to as a "selling division." Checks and remittances, although in the sub-
sidiary's name, were honored only upon the signatures of those who were also officers
of the parent corporation, and were frequently used to transfer the subsidiary's ac-
count to that of the defendant. In an action by the receiver of the bank on a note-
indebtedness, owed to the bank by the defendant, the defendant successfully set-off
the subsidiary's deposit. On appeal, held, reversed. No mutuality in the cross-claims
since the manufacturing and sales corporations were distinct entities. Feswht v. Real
Silk Hosiery Mills.,
It is frequently stated that where the corporate fiction is resorted to as a means of
evading defined public policy or a statute,2 or of achieving a forbidden monopoly,3
or of perpetrating fraud,4 or of immunizing the parent corporation from torts or
contract6 liabilities apparently incurred by its subsidiary, the court at the instance
of the injured party will pierce the corporate shell to fix responsibility on the actual
principal.7 The novel question raised by the instant case is whether in the absence of
'12 N.E.(2d) ioi9 (Ind. App. 1938).
2People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (i89o); State ex rel.
Marsh v. Safford, 117 Ohio St. 576, 159 N.E. 829 (1927); United States v. Delaware, L. &
W. Ry. Co., 238 U.S. 56 (1914); United States v. Lehigh ValleyRy. Co., 220 U.S. 257 (i9II).
3 Federal Gravel Co. v. Detroit & M. Ry. Co., 249 Mich. 49, 226 N.W. 677 (1929); United
States v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 203 Fed. 295 (D.C. Ohio 1912); Aluminum Co. of
America v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 284 Fed. 4o (C.C.A. 3d 1922).
4 Mosher v. Lee, 32 Ariz. 560, 261 Pac. 35 (1927); Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Warren
Light & Water Co., 17o Ark. 5o, 278 S.W. 643 (1925); Donovan v. Purtell, 216 III. 629,
75 N.E. 334 (1905).
5 Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C.C.A. 2d 1928); The William Van Driel,
252 Fed. 35 (C.C.A. 4th i918); Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Hinton, ioo Ohio St. 505, X26
N.E. 88i (i929). Cf. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926); Owl
Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., Inc., 24 F. (2d) 718 (D.C. Del. 1928).
6 Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C.C.A. 4th 1920); Start
Electric Ry. v. McGinty Contracting Co., 238 Fed. 657 (C.C.A. 6th 1917). Cf. First Nat'lBank
v. Walton, 246 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928); Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain
Transportation Co., 31 F. (2d) 265 (C.C.A. 2d 1929).
7 For general discussion as to when courts will disregard corporate personality see Wormser,
Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Col. L. Rev. 496 (1912); Stevens, Corporations
§ 19 (1936).
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such circumstances the parent corporation itself can for its own benefit request the
court to recognize the essential oneness of parent and subsidiary.8
No satisfactory criteria have been evolved for determining when corporate identity
exists,9 the cases revealing an extraordinary preoccupation with the details of the
particular organization1o The statement that the corporate insulation will be broken
down when the subsidiary is an "agency," "adjunct," "instrumentality," "alter ego,"
"tool," "corporate double," or "dummy" of the parent is but to state a conclusion for
a reason. The facts which give rise to such conclusion, however, reveal that where
the parent corporation exerts a direct intervention in the management, operation, and
finances of the subsidiary, assimilation of the units will be found."
The court's refusal to find assimilation at the suit of the parent corporation in the
instant case might be justified on the ground that the corporation by voluntarily
incorporating its subsidiary should not now set the machinery of the law to undo
what it itself has done. Unless great injustice would otherwise result, no reason is
apparent for not insisting upon consistency in the corporation's conduct.
Where the interest of the state creating the subsidiary is involved, as in the tax
cases, ' 2 the courts have generally refused to disregard the separateness of parent and
subsidiary, albeit no technical estoppel could be asserted by the state. In order to
avoid undue complication of the law, third persons likewise should be permitted to
insist upon the independent status of the subsidiary even though such third persons,
like the bank in the instant case, cannot show that they have relied to their detriment
upon the ostensible separateness of the subsidiary.
Despite the total financial integration and identity of personnel in the instant case,
were the bank the one seeking to appropriate the subsidiary's account on the parent's
note, it seems only problematical whether the court would have disregarded the fiction
of corporate entity where the set-off would operate as a preference over the other
creditors of the subsidiary. In refusing the set-off in the converse situation the court's
solicitude for the creditors of the bank is in line with the modem trend of confining
8 See Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan, 219 Cal. 184, 25 P. (2d) 839 (1933), where
holding company recovered on false representations made by defendant to subsidiary. While
the assimilation of holding company and subsidiary were one of the points urged by the
plaintiff in his right to recover, the court chose to base its decision on other grounds. See also
General Discount Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, Detroit, 5 F. Supp. 709 (Mich. 1933).
9 See Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations,
39 Yale L.J. 193 (1929); Stevens, Corporations 83 (r936): "Whether a distinction between
the personalities will be made when there is a dominant and a subsidiary corporation cannot
be determined for all purposes in one action. The distinction may be ignored as to one pair
of corporations for one purpose, and scrupulously regarded as to the same corporations
for another purpose."
10 For a table of the various types of organization and operations which link parent and
subsidiary see Douglas and Shanks, op. cit. supra note 9, at 595 note 8.
"Failure to provide' the subsidiary with sufficient assets, failure to keep separate accounts
or to observe the ritual of eparate management may be other factors influencing the finding.
See Stevens, Corporations §18 (1936).
12 In Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex. rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); Com-
monwealth v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 297 Pa. 3o8, 147 Atl. 242 (1929).
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set-off in bankruptcy strictly to its traditional limits.'3 Although the preference
created by set-off seems firmly entrenched in precedent,14 and is recognized by the
express language of the Bankruptcy Act,1S the set-off demanded in the instant case
is not statutory set-off, but equitable. Whatever equity the parent corporation may
have had in its subsidiary's depositx6 is nullified by the desirability of narrowing the
scope of a rule which is an anomaly in the first instance.
Corporations-Right of a Stockholder Not within the Statutory Class To Inspect
the Corporate Books-[Illinois.-The plaintiff, a stockholder of record for less than six
months and owning less than five per cent of the outstanding shares, petitioned for a
writ of mandamus to compel the defendants individually and as officers of the corpora-
tion to permit him to examine its books. The first paragraph of the applicable section
of the statutes' grants a right of inspection for proper purposes to stockholders "of
record for at least six months... or who shall be the holder of record of at least five per
cent of all the outstanding shares of a corporation. . . ." The second paragraph pro-
vides for a penalty upon an officer of the corporation for refusal to allow such a stock-
holder to examine the books upon showing of proper purpose, while the third para-
graph of the statute provides that "nothing herein contained shall impair the power
of any court.., upon proof by a shareholder of proper purpose, to compel by mandamus
... the production for examination of the books... of a corporation." Held, for the de-
fendants. Since the plaintiff is not within the statutory class, he is not entitled to a
writ of mandamus to compel the production of the corporate books. Neiman v.
Templeton, Kenly & Co., Ltd.2
Statutes in many jurisdictions have extended the common law right of a stock-
holder to examine the corporate books by removal of the requirement that the stock-
holder show proper purpose,3 or by the imposition of a penalty on officers and directors
13 Cf. Elliot v. Flynn Bros., 192 S.E. 400 (S.C. 1937); Hodgin v. People's Nat'l Bank, 124
N.C. 540, 32 S.E. 887 (x899). See also note, 4 Univ. Chi. L.Rev. 330 (,937).
'4 Yardley v. Clothier, 5i Fed. 5o6 (C.C.A. 3d 1892); Upham v. Bramwell, 1o5 Ore. 597,
209 Pac. 100 (1922); see Gilbert's Collier, Bankruptcy §§ 1426-i43o (4th ed. 1937); Glenn,
Creditor's Rights and Remedies §428 (1915).
's 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. §to8 (i937).
,6 See dictum in Kimberly Coal Co. v. Douglas, 45 F. (2d) 25, 27 (C.C.A. 6th 1930) to the
effect that property and debts of the subsidiary are in equity considered those of the parent
corporation.
'Section 45 of the Business Corporation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 32, §157.45.
* 294 Ill. App. 45, 13 N.E. (2d) 290 (1938).
3 For instance see Smith's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1919, c. 32, §38; Cahill's Cons. Laws N.Y. 1935
,
c. 6o, §io; S.C. Civ. Code 1932, §7750; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 1925, Art. 1328; Utah Rev. Stat.
1933, title 18. C. 2, §31. See also Estuar, The Nature and Extent of the Right of a Stockholder
to Inspect the Books of a Corporation, 17 Phillipine L. J. o5 (1937); 5 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp.
§2220 (perm. ed. 193).
As to what constitutes a proper purpose see Bums v. Drenner, 220 Ala. 404, 125 So. 667
(1930); Davis v. Cambria Title and Savings and Trust Co., 304 Pa. 32, 155 Atl. io8 (i93i);
Miller v. Spanogle, 275 Ill. App. 335 ('934); Carey v. Dalgarn Const. Co., 168 La. 621, 122
So. 884 (1929); 8o A.L.R. 1503; 20 Calif. L. Rev. 449 (1932).
